The British constitution: a very short introduction
In: Very short introductions 349
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In: Very short introductions 349
Tracing constitutional thought from the Enlightenment to the present, Martin Loughlin shows how a tool for the protection of self-government has become a means for subverting popular will. Across the globe, constitutions now displace democratic decision-making, as courts interpret values in the law that ultimately trump legislative action.
A collection of brand new and revised essays from eminent scholar of public law, Martin Loughlin, that systematizes his work on political jurisprudence - a school of thought that contends the key to understanding the nature of legal order lies in how political authority is constituted
"Foundations of Public Law offers a distinctive, provocative theory of public law, building on the views first outlined in The Idea of Public Law (OUP, 2003). The theory aims to identify the essential character of public law, explain its particular modes of operation, and specify its unique task. Public law is conceived broadly as a type of law that comes into existence as a consequence of the secularization, rationalization and positivization of the medieval idea of fundamental law. Formed as a result of the changes that give birth to the modern state, public law establishes the authority and legitimacy of modern governmental ordering. Public law today is a universal phenomenon, but its origins are European. Part I of the book examines the conditions of its formation, showing how much the concept borrowed from the refined debates of medieval jurists. Part II then examines the nature of public law. Drawing on a line of juristic inquiry that developed from the late-sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries - extending from Bodin, Althusius, Lipsius, Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and Pufendorf to the later works of Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Smith and Hegel - it presents an account of public law as a special type of political reason. The remaining three Parts unpack the core elements of this concept: state, constitution, and government. By taking this broad approach to the subject, Professor Loughlin shows how, rather than being viewed as a limitation on power, law is better conceived as a means by which public power is generated. And by explaining the way that these core elements of state, constitution and government were shaped respectively by the technological, bourgeois, and disciplinary revolutions of the 16th-19th centuries, he reveals a concept of public law of considerable ambiguity, complexity and resilience"--
This work traces the main dimensions of the relationship between central and local government, concentrating upon the role played by law in shaping that relationship. It demonstrates how the issues raised are linked to the system of parliamentary democracy, and to the tradition of public law.
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In: The political quarterly, Band 90, Heft 4, S. 785-793
ISSN: 1467-923X
AbstractIn his 2019 Reith Lectures on the rise of law and decline of politics, Jonathan Sumption presents a thesis that, on its face, seems identical to that of J.A.G. Griffith's defence of the political constitution. Given the radical differences in their views on equality, democracy, and redistribution—with Griffith working in the tradition of democratic socialism espoused by the Webbs, Tawney and Laski, and Sumption expressing the libertarian philosophy underpinning Thatcherite policies—this is puzzling. This article sets their views in historical and political context and argues that the similarities are superficial, whereas the differences are profound. It then proceeds to show the weaknesses in Sumption's defence of his thesis.
In: The political quarterly, Band 89, Heft 4, S. 659-666
ISSN: 1467-923X
AbstractIn 1885 A.V. Dicey identified the rule of law as a key principle of British constitutional law. Presenting it both as a product of English common law method and an expression of classical liberalism, Dicey's concept lingered on into the twentieth century but mainly as a contentious ideological doctrine or simply as a vague rhetorical slogan. During the last fifty years, however, the concept has been revived, recrafted, relocated and reified. The rule of law has become a universal trope, albeit with a range of contestable meanings. This article traces this development, showing how it has been converted into a phrase of considerable political potency not only domestically but also in the international arena.
In: LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 18/2017
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Working paper
In: Global constitutionalism: human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 9-30
ISSN: 2045-3825
AbstractThis article examines the origins of the concept of constitutional pluralism that has emerged in the last decade and it critically assesses the claims of its advocates. It argues that the claims made on behalf of the concept cannot be sustained and seeks to show that constitutional pluralism is an oxymoronic concept.
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 218-237
ISSN: 1741-2730
This article examines the meaning and significance of the concept of constituent power in constitutional thought by showing how it acts as a boundary concept with respect to three types of legal thought: normativism, decisionism and relationalism. The concept can be fully appreciated, it suggests, only by adopting a relationalist method. This relationalist method permits us to deal with the paradoxical aspects of constitutional founding creatively and to grasp how constituent power, as the generative aspect of the political power relationship, works not only at founding moments but also within the dynamics of constitutional development. Relationalism realizes this ambition by exposing the tension between unity and hierarchy in constitutional foundation and the tension between the people-as-one and the people-as-the governed in the course of constitutional development. It contends, contrary to normativist claims, that constituent power remains a central concept of constitutional thought. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
This paper contends that, notwithstanding the impressive philosophical argument Lindahl presents in his book, his essential point does not extend to the plurality of normative orders that operate throughout the social world. Rather, his argument demonstrates precisely what is special about the political domain within which the modern idea of public law is situated. Lindahl's novel concept of a-legality is therefore best grasped as a reformulation of the modern concept of jus politicum, droit politique, political jurisprudence.
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In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 218-237
ISSN: 1474-8851